

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 IO-10 SAJ-01 ERDA-05 NRC-05 OES-03 /088 W

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R 311857Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4771

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 28438

SHAPE FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, FR, UR

SUBJECT: GISCARD VISIT TO MOSCOW: LAST RITES

REF: A. PARIS 27671 (NOTAL)

B. MOSCOW 4978 (NOTAL)

C. USNATO 5890 (NOTAL)

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1. TO ROUND OUT RECORD WE CALLED ON TREMEAU, QUAI'S SOVIET DESK OFFICER, WHO HAD BEEN JUNIOR MEMBER OF QUAI'S DELEGATION DURING GISCARD'S MOSCOW VISIT. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS SUPPLEMENTING PREVIOUS PARIS AND MOSCOW REPORTING. END SUMMARY.

2. REGARDING ATMOSPHERE, TREMEAU SAID THAT, WHILE VISIT WAS NOT AS DISAPPOINTING AS PRESS HAD DESCRIBED IT, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS FRENCH-SOVIET BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, ONE COULD ALSO NOT CALL IT A SUCCESS. HE SAID BREZHNEV WAS OBVIOUSLY TIRED AND DISTANT ON FIRST DAY AND HAD TO SIT DOWN SEVERAL TIMES. HE SEEMED IN MUCH BETTER PHYSICAL FORM AT LATER ENCOUNTERS. TREMEAU ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT AT STATE BANQUET HE THOUGHT HE HAD NOTICED SMALL SCAR ON BREZHNEV'S NECK WHICH HE HAD NOT NOTICED AT RAMBOUILLET, BUT STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT CLOSE AND THAT LIGHTING COULD HAVE CREATED ILLUSION.

3. TREMEAU THEN CONFIRMED VARIOUS OTHER ACCOUNTS THAT NEGOTIATION OF JOINT DECLARATION HAD BEEN VERY ARDUOUS. THE CSCE NEGOTIATION, WHICH ANDREANI HAD ALREADY DESCRIBED TO US (REFTEL A), WAS PROBABLY THE MOST DIFFICULT. IN SPITE OF EARLIER SOVIET STATEMENTS THAT THEY LOOKED TO BILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT CSCE FINAL ACT, SOVIET NEGOTIATOR DUBININ MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IN LONG GRINDING SESSIONS THAT SOVIETS WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO ANY SPECIFIC CSCE IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL, ALTHOUGH USSR INTENDED TO ABIDE BY THE FINAL ACT. TREMEAU SAID HE INTERPRETED SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON THIS POINT TO MEAN THAT THEY MIGHT BE MORE WILLING TO MAKE IMPLEMENTATION CONCESSIONS IN QUIET EXCHANGES AT WORKING LEVEL AT TIMES OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. TREMEAU THOUGHT CORE OF SOVIET RESISTANCE ON CSCE DURING GISCARD'S VISIT WAS THEIR DESIRE NOT TO BE PAINTED INTO A PUBLIC CORNER AS THE "DEFENDANTS" ON BASKET III. OTHERS AT QUAI CONCERNED WITH CSCE ARE LESS OPTIMISTIC AND VIEW THESE SOVIET TACTICS AS SIGNAL THAT TIME IS NOT YET RIGHT TO GO VERY

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FAR OR VERY FAST ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION, PARTICULARLY OF BASKET III.

4. TREMEAU SAID THAT THE OTHER MAJOR NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN AREA OF DISARMAMENT. HE SAID THAT DUBININ, FOR INSTANCE, SPENT THREE HOURS PRESSING THE FRENCH TO ACCEPT A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO "PACIFIC COEXISTENCE." THE FACT THAT THE JOINT

DECLARATION DOES NOT CONTAIN THIS PHRASE OR ANY
REFERENCE TO "MILITARY DETENTE" OR "IRREVERSIBLE
DETENTE" REQUIRED A MAJOR FRENCH NEGOTIATING EFFORT.

5. SOVIETS, TREMEAU SAID, ALSO PRESSED FRENCH VERY
HARD TO AGREE MORE OR LESS SPECIFICALLY TO THEIR
FORMULA FOR PROHIBITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
EVEN THOUGH THEY EVADED EVERY EFFORT TO DEFINE WHAT
THAT TERM MEANT. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW KNEW FRENCH POSITION
IN ADVANCE THEY SEEMED DISAPPOINTED THAT FRENCH WOULD
ONLY AGREE, AFTER EXTENSIVE BACK AND FORTH, TO "PURSUE

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WITH INTEREST THE STUDY OF THIS QUESTION."

6. IT WENT SIMILARLY ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS ISSUES. THE SOVIETS, TO FRENCH
SURPRISE, MADE AN APPARENTLY SERIOUS EFFORT TO
PERSUADE THEM TO SIGN THE NPT. WHEN THIS FAILED
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THEY FELL BACK TO EFFORT TO BEEF UP SENTENCE FRENCH
HAD VOLUNTEERED ON THIS ISSUE AND PRESSED TO HAVE
RESULTANT PARA INCLUDED AMONG SEVERAL DISARMAMENT
POINTS ON WHICH PARTIES EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION "TO
DEVELOP EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND THEIR CONSULTATIONS."
(FRENCH VERSION OF JOINT DECLARATION BEING AIR
POUCHED. THE PRECISE ISSUE HERE WAS WHETHER SENTENCE
NOW AT BOTTOM OF PAGE 5 THIS TEXT SHOULD APPEAR THERE
OR AFTER FIRST PARA ON PAGE 6 AS SOVIETS WANTED IT.)

7. LOOKING AT GISCARD'S MOSCOW EXPERIENCE IN OVERALL
TERMS TREMEAU, LIKE OTHERS, FOUND IT HARD TO
CHARACTERIZE CLEARLY. HE HAD NO DOUBTS THAT THE
MAIN LINES OF FRENCH-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD CONTINUE
AS BEFORE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS BILATERAL MATTERS.
HOWEVER HE THOUGHT THAT THE PERIOD WHEN THE QUAI
COULD RIGHTLY STRESS THAT IT HAD A PRIVILEGED RELATION
WITH THE USSR HAD, AS RAYMOND ARON ALSO SUGGESTED
IN A RECENTLY WIDELY-NOTED ANALYSIS, PERHAPS BEEN
OVERTAKEN.
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